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LA A M E R IC A  N U E S T R A
N O T  A  L O S T  C O N T I N E N T :
U . S .  -  L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  R e l a t i o n s  
i n  t h e  B u s h  E r a
M a x  J . C a s t r o
U.S.-centric analyses of the relationship between this country and the nations of south of the Rio Grande generally hold that in recent years Latin America has “fallen off the map.” Authors in this school usually lament the 
low priority United States foreign policy traditionally has 
assigned to the region—absent revolutions and attribute the 
current level of especially pronounced inattention to the 
influence of 9-11.
Moisés Naim, editor in chief of Foreign Policy, in an article title 
“The Lost Continent” that appeared in the November/December 
2006 issue of the same journal, exemplifies this widely held view. 
Virtually equating U.S. priorities under the Bush administration 
with the concerns of the international community, Naím 
describes what happened after the terrorist attacks of 2001: 
“Naturally, the world’s attention centered almost exclusively on 
terrorism, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, and on the 
nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran” (emphasis added).
Because Latin America lacks nuclear weapons, suicidal 
terrorists, big “emerging markets like India and China,” and has 
only one country with really major energy resources (Venezuela), 
the continent “cant compete on the worlds stage in any aspect, 
even as a threat.” Indeed, Latin America can t even compete as an 
object of pity because its tragedies pale in comparison to Africa’s.
The situation looks quite different, however, if one departs 
from the “we are the world” perspective from which Naím and 
others in the same camp see the world exclusively through the 
eyes of the world’s hegemonic nation. A different reality comes 
into view if instead we look at the U.S.-Latin American 
relationship starting from the assumption that el sur también 
existe.
The United States may have lost sight of Latin America, but 
Latin America has hardly ceased to exist and evolve, nor has it 
taken its eye off the United States. And, in the last decades, and 
especially since the turn of the century, there have been some 
significant developments, both in Latin America and in the
region’s relationship with its northern neighbor. The new 
Washington consensus that consigns the region to irrelevance 
tends to miss or disregard these almost completely.
One obvious change is that Latin America has become more 
independent and less subservient to the United States. This is 
arguably a historic development despite the fact that it takes place 
within the context of continuing U.S. global and regional 
dominance and profound north-south asymmetries in power and 
wealth in this hemisphere. There are myriad manifestations of 
the new phenomenon coming in different forms and at multiple 
levels. In country after country, Latin American voters have 
demonstrated that they are perfectly willing to vote for leaders 
the United States opposes. At one point, a former U.S. 
ambassador to Bolivia weighted in heavily with threats if the 
leftist candidate were to be elected. Bolivian reaction at the grass 
roots was such that Evo Morales, the target of the attacks, said the 
ambassador was acting as his campaign manager. Later, Morales 
easily won the presidency. In 1989, U.S. threats undoubtedly 
scared some Nicaraguan voters into throwing the Sandinistas out 
of power. In 2006, the meddling of the U.S. ambassador did not 
work and may have backfired; Nicaraguans elected Daniel Ortega, 
despite the fact that Ortega has lost much of his revolutionary 
luster.
These democratically elected leaders, in turn, while still 
trying to maintain friendly relations with the United States, have 
demonstrated a substantially greater independence from 
Washington than earlier generations of Latin American rulers.1 
Unlike previously, however, there now are stricter limits in 
relation to the lengths Latin American governments will go in 
order to please the United States.
The Bush administration tried hard but, to its great chagrin, 
failed to twist the arms of the Latin American members of the 
UN Security Council into approving a resolution authorizing the 
invasion of Iraq. Not only Chile but even Fox’s Mexico refused to 
go along, denying the Bush administration even the veneer of
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legitimacy for its illegal war.
Such a declaration of independence on the part of Latin 
America and such a diplomatic defeat for the United States on a 
key issue is all the more significant because it came at the hand of 
countries with which the United States has had very friendly 
relations. Both countries, moreover, had a strong national interest 
in being looked upon favorably by Bush, who could confer 
significant rewards or inflict punishment in key areas including 
trade (Chile) and immigration (Mexico).
The attitude of Mexico and Chile vis-á-vis Iraq is a measure 
of the weakness of the U.S. case for war but also reflects the 
impact of electoral democracy. Latin Americans have a long and 
painful history with U.S. intervention and, partly as a result, 
voters in the region were massively opposed to the war. Only in 
the Middle East is public opinion about Bush and his foreign 
policy more intensely negative tan in Latin America. According to 
some surveys, even the region s privileged elites have a more 
favorable opinion of Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro than they do 
of Bush. Thus the political cost of subservience on Iraq would 
have been great, greater in fact than any punishment Bush might 
deliver. While in the Middle East, the democracy the United 
States has preached has taken hold in only a few places, in Latin 
America democracy is now the norm. But, in both regions, 
wherever democracy has triumphed, the results often have not 
pleased Washington.
Moreover, while the aborted 2003 UN vote on Iraq was a 
major departure from the past, it was no anomaly. Since that 
time, Latin America has given other signs of its assertiveness. In 
electing a new Secretary-General, the OAS rejected two 
candidates successively backed by the United States and elected a 
third, a Chilean socialist. Later, the same organization failed to 
approve a new “democratic charter” the Bush administration 
hoped could be used as a club against Venezuela and any other 
miscreants that might pop up in the region. More recently, the 
U.S. choice for the country to represent Latin America on the UN 
Security Council failed to win approval.
On the economic front, Brazil has been among the countries 
leading the charge against a model of regional and global 
economic integration tailored to the needs of the United States 
and other wealthy nations. More generally, the region s economic 
dependence on the United States has decreased as relations with 
Europe, Japan, and lately China have increased. And, Argentina 
has shown that one can not only defy the Washington consensus 
and the IMF and survive but one can prosper by doing it.
Wishful thinkers and media purveyors of convenient truths 
in the United States like to dwell on the real and significant 
differences between such leaders as Chávez, Lula, Bachelet, 
Morales, Ortega, Tabaré Vázquez, and Kirchner. But they usually 
fail to note the historical significance of the fact that for the first 
time in history many leaders of major Latin American countries, 
despite their divergences on matters of style and substance, have 
decided to say “no” to the United States. Thus, while the big 
North American cat has been away, busy trying to remake the 
Middle East in its own image, the Latin American mice have been 
playing their own game.
A second important development, distinct from but 
unrelated to the fist and with broad implications for relations 
between the United States and Latin America has been the 
growing ideological divergence between north and south. Since 
the presidency of Ronald Reagan and, especially, during the 
current administration, U.S. politics has been dominated by the 
ideology of laissez faire capitalism or, in the words of the late 
Pope John Paul II, by the precepts of a “savage capitalism.”
Beginning in the late 1980s, the United States and the 
international financial institutions, through massive coercion and 
a modicum of persuasion, induced many Latin American 
countries to adopt economic policies consistent with the ideology 
that came to be known as neoliberalism. Although the term never 
acquired wide usage in this country, during this same period the 
United States itself was instituting similar policies domestically 
(although not under external coercion nor in as radical a form as 
it demanded from other countries) under such euphemistic 
terms as “supply-side economics,” “welfare reform,” and tax 
reform.”
While some of these measures were necessary to curtail 
inflation and tackle other economic ills, overall the consequences 
of U.S.-style “trickle down economics” and neoliberalism in Latin 
America, for vast sectors of the middle class and for most of the 
poor in the United States and even more dramatically in Latin 
America, have ranged from devastating to disappointing.
In Latin America, the failure of neoliberalism to deliver a 
better life for most people has led to political defeat for many of 
the leaders and the political forces backing neoliberal policies and 
the emergence of new leadership offering moderate or radical 
alternatives to neoliberalism.
In contrast, in the United States neither major political party 
has offered voters an alternative to laissez faire ideology or to the 
absolute corporate domination of societal priorities. Here the 
politics of symbolism, moralism, patriotism, and emotion have 
prevailed even as economic inequality has reached 
unprecedented dimensions and the real wages of blue and white 
collar workers have stagnated. (The 2006 elections may or may 
not signal the early phases of the reversal of this trend. If they do, 
the reaction of U.S. citizens to hypercapitalist policies may come 
to be seen as slower but not essentially different to the Latin 
American reaction).
The result of these divergent paths has been, to use an 
admittedly extremely rough analogy, is that, if the color scheme 
used to map U.S. electoral results were to be transposed to map 
Latin America, much of the map would be a deep blue, with big 
patches of red in Colombia and Central America, with Mexico 
displaying an almost equal division between the two colors.
In the United States, while the electorate has been almost 
equally divided during recent elections, a map of the distribution 
of power over the last six years would reveal the overwhelming 
domination of the Republican right.
This analogy, if anything, understates the stark ideological 
divide for what currently passes for liberal or even left in the 
United States, for example the policies favored by the mainstream 
of the Democratic Party, would be considered right or center- 
right in much of Latin America today.
While Latin America has been moving leftward, the 
conservative thrust has been so powerful and seemingly enduring 
that in a recent book some European observers described the 
United States as “The Right Nation.”2 This ideological divide, 
which separates the United States from Latin America on many 
issues, has significant implications for the future of hemispheric 
relations. The U.S. rejection of the kind of social 
democratic/redistributionist policies that were inherent in the 
construction of the European Union is a source of Latin 
American resistance to U.S. schemes to promote regional 
economic integration. Undoubtedly, it is one of the underlying 
reasons for the downfall of such U.S.-sponsored projects as the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas.
A third major new development with long term implications 
for the U.S.-Latin American relationship is migration and,
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perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent, the overall growth of the 
Latino population of the United States. The latter is a 
demographic process driven both by high levels of immigration 
and a fast rate of natural increase within the Latino population.3
Mass migration weaves a complex network of social, 
cultural, economic and political relationships and 
interdependencies between north and south with consequences 
that are not yet completely understood.
Economically, for many Latin American countries, 
remittances have become crucial at both the national and the 
household level. At the same time, politically and economically 
important sectors of the U.S. economy are structurally dependent 
of immigrant Latin American labor. The latter fact, and the rapid 
growth of the Latino electorate, undercuts the kind of draconian 
immigration policy favored by, for instance, the Republican 
majority that controlled the House of Representatives during the 
last Congress. It also likely ensures relatively high levels of Latin 
American immigration for the foreseeable future and thus 
growing Latino political and economic clout.
To date, the Cuban American exception aside, Latino 
influence on U.S. policies regarding Latin American has been 
scant at best. But this may change as the Latino population as a 
whole and various national subgroups reach a critical mass, 
nationally and in an expanding set of geographical spaces across 
the nation.
The immigrant marches of 2006 may presage a new level of 
Latino activism and consciousness that might be mobilized for 
purposes other than exercising a virtual veto against extreme 
anti-immigration policies. However, that veto is, in itself, already 
an important Latino contribution to the interests of Latin 
Americans.
But the main impact of growing Latino political po wer on 
U.S.-Latin American relations depends on the role Latinos play in 
determining the overall balance of political forces in the United 
States. In the 2006 Congressional elections, 70 percent of Latinos 
voted for Democratic candidates, a swing of 10-15 percentage 
points against the Republicans compared to the general elections 
of 2004. Exit polls suggest Latino rejection of the Republicans 
was based not only on the party’s immigration stance but also on 
Latino opposition to the Iraq war and to Republican domestic 
policies.
Any prospect for a more enlightened U.S. policy regarding 
Latin America requires the emergence of a progressive politics in 
the United States. The role of Latinos, in alliance with other 
minorities and liberal whites, would be a key to such a political 
evolution. While the realization of such a scenario is neither 
immediate nor certain, the recent election indicates that Latinos 
already are contributing to checking the power of the most 
reactionary forces in the U.S. political system.
In the meantime, while a Democratic Congress may slightly 
temper the tension in U.S.-Latin American relations, overall the 
immediate prospects are still pessimistic. Washington is certain to 
deplore the probate reelection of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and 
to be vexed if the candidate of the left wins the election in 
Ecuador. Latin Americans for their part abhor the border fence 
scheduled to be built on the U.S.-Mexico border, an initiative of 
the Republican Congressional right signed into law this fall by 
George W. Bush—in spite of the President’s rhetoric in favor of a
moderately gentler and kinder version of immigration reform. 
Finally, notwithstanding predictable Congressional pressure to 
relax the most extreme components of the embargo, under Bush] 
the United States will continue to wage economic war against 
Cuba, a policy which acts as a constant reminder to many Latin
Americans that the leopard refuses to change its spots.
N O T E S
1 Hugo Chavez is the exception in regard to the first point, 
although one can argue that while Chavez's words have been 
confrontational his actions have been much less so while the 
United States generally has talked in softer tones but 
undertaken some decidedly hostile actions against Chavez, 
especially the apparent tacit (or active?) support for the failed 
coup.
2 See: The Right Nation: Conservative Power in Latin America by 
John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, New York, Penguin 
Press, 2004.
3 Natural increase" is a term used in population studies which 
refers to the number of births minus the number of deaths in a 
given population over a defined time period. Overall, the Latino 
population is younger than the U.S. populations as a whole, thus 
there are proportionally fewer deaths and more women of child­
bearing age in the Latino population. In addition, statistically 
Latinas bear more children than the average for women in the 
United States. These factors make for a higher rate of natural 
increase among Latinos than in the general population.
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